Strength in numbers or guilt by association?: Intragroup effects of female chief executive appointments by Dixon-Fowler, Heather & NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University
Archived version from NCDOCKS Institutional Repository http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/ 
Strength in numbers or guilt by association?: 
Intragroup effects of female chief executive appointments
Authors:
Dixon-Fowler, H., Ellstrand, A., & Johnson, J
Abstract
We predict that the media reports on female CEOs as a coherent group, whereas male CEOs are 
treated as individuals by the media. We also suggest that the resulting investors’ perceptions of 
group entitativity of female-led firms may not only influence the succession event–performance 
relationship at the focal firm, but may also have a significant effect on the value of other female-
led companies. Results of a text analysis and an event study of appointments of female CEOs to 
Fortune 1000 firms provide support for these predictions. 
Dixon-Fowler, H., Ellstrand, A., & Johnson, J (2013) "Strength in numbers or guilt by association?: 
Intragroup effects of female chief executive appointments" Strategic Management Journal #34: pp.1488–1501
Version of Record available @ (DOI: 10.1002/smj.2076)
STRENGTH IN NUMBERS OR GUILT BY 
ASSOCIATION? INTRAGROUP EFFECTS OF FEMALE 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE ANNOUNCEMENTS 
HEATHER R. DIXON-FOWLER,1* ALAN E. ELLSTRAND,2  and JONATHAN L. 
JOHNSON2 
1 
Department of Management, Appalachian State University, Walker College of 
Business, Boone, North Carolina, U.S.A. 
2  
Department of Management, Sam M. Walton College of Business, University of 
Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas, U.S.A. 
We predict that the media reports on female CEOs as a coherent group, whereas male CEOs are 
treated as individuals by the media. We also suggest that the resulting investors’ perceptions of 
group entitativity of female-led firms may not only influence the succession event–performance 
relationship at the focal firm, but may also have a significant effect on the value of other female- 
led companies. Results of a text analysis and an event study of appointments of female CEOs 
to Fortune 1000 firms provide support for these predictions.  
INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between managerial succession 
and stockholder wealth has been the subject of 
a large body of strategic management research 
(e.g., Beatty and Zajac, 1987; Davidson, Worrell, 
and Dutia, 1993; Friedman and Singh, 1989; 
Furtado and Rozeff, 1987; Reinganum, 1985; 
Worrell and Davidson, 1987; Worrell et al., 1986). 
As a major firm event, CEO succession may 
foretell upcoming changes in top management 
team composition (Wagner, Pfeffer, and O’Reilly, 
1984) or a significant change in strategic direction, 
decision making, and, ultimately, firm performance 
(for a review, see Kesner and Sebora, 1994; 
Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli, 1992). Thus, 
CEO succession may represent a signal regarding 
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the future of the firm (e.g., Beatty and Zajac, 1987; 
Kesner and Sebora, 1994; Lubatkin and Shrieves, 
1986). 
Prior research examining the influence of CEO 
characteristics in the linkage between succession 
and performance has primarily focused on the 
insider/outsider distinction of the successor’s ori- 
gin with results reflecting mixed performance 
implications (e.g., Boeker, 1992; Canella and 
Lubatkin, 1993; Furtado and Rozeff, 1987; Kesner 
and Sebora, 1994; Shen and Cannella, 2002). Few 
researchers have devoted attention to the rela- 
tionship between  other CEO characteristics  and 
shareholder wealth. One exception is a recent 
study, which found that shareholders react more 
negatively to the announcement of female CEO 
appointments than to male CEO appointments (Lee 
and James, 2007). The results of the study suggest 
that the demographic characteristics of the succes- 
sor may influence investor perceptions and affect 
firm value (Lee and James, 2007). 
Lee and James (2007) take a novel approach in 
suggesting that announcements of female CEOs 
 
 
 
focus more attention on gender and gender- 
related issues than announcements of male CEOs, 
resulting in a much more negative response 
from shareholders. This is consistent with Beatty 
and Zajac’s (1987) response to the inconsistent 
findings regarding market reactions to executive 
succession events. These authors emphasize that it 
is investors’ perceptions of the signal, rather than 
the signal itself, which is most important (Beatty 
and Zajac, 1987). With limited information for 
making judgments, investors’ perceptions may be 
influenced by the content of media reports (e.g., 
Deephouse, 2000; Johnson et al., 2005; Lee and 
James, 2007). 
Several recent studies suggest that the media 
may play an important role in influencing 
investors’ perceptions and  investment  decisions 
by influencing firm reputation and legitimation 
(Deephouse, 2000; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; 
Johnson et al., 2005; Lee and James, 2007; 
Pollock and Rindova, 2003). Further, the media 
not only propagates legitimacy, but it may also 
influence  perceptions  by  creating  “buzz”  about 
a firm or conveying a sense of “dramatized 
reality” of an  organization  based  on  what  may 
be otherwise factually accurate information about 
firms by stressing certain facts and meanings 
while underplaying others (Pollock and Rindova, 
2003; Rindova, Pollock, and Hayward, 2006). 
Thus, by selectively emphasizing or downplay- 
ing certain information, the press can reinforce 
stereotypes around female CEOs (Daily and Dal- 
ton, 2000; Lee and James, 2007). Entitativity 
reflects the degree to which groups are viewed 
as being a coherent, unified collective (Campbell, 
1958; Hamilton and Sherman, 1996). Drawing on 
the social psychology literature, we propose that 
the media homogenizes the image of female CEOs, 
thereby creating an entitative group. Substantial 
empirical evidence exists suggesting that the press 
affects investors’ opinions by influencing firm rep- 
utation and legitimation (e.g., Deephouse, 2000; 
Johnson et al., 2005; Lee and James, 2007; Pollock 
and Rindova, 2003; Zuckerman, 1999). 
Women have made great strides in entering the 
workforce and attaining positions in management, 
yet progress at the very  top  executive  level 
has been much more limited (Daily, Certo, and 
Dalton, 1999; Helfat, Harris, and Wolfson, 2006; 
Lee and James, 2007). While the “glass ceiling” 
phenomenon has been  studied  from  a  number 
of perspectives, we consider the influence of a 
special status conferred upon female CEOs by 
examining the effects of female CEO succession 
events on the stock price of all firms employing 
female CEOs. In this paper, we explore whether 
female executives experience strength in numbers, 
guilt by association, or both. In other words, 
does the announcement of an additional female 
CEO increase the perceived legitimacy of existing 
female CEOs as well  as  the  firms  they  lead? 
Or does a negative contagion effect exist that 
casts doubt on the competence of female CEOs? 
Additionally, do investors interpret the dismissal of 
one female CEO for poor performance as reflective 
of female executives in general? 
This study contributes to the strategic man- 
agement literature by showing that certain CEO 
characteristics — in this case, gender — may influ- 
ence not only the succession event – performance 
relationship at a given firm, but may also have a 
significant effect on the value of other companies 
perceived as being tied to that firm by virtue of 
being led by female CEOs. Although the bulk of 
research on the relationship between endorsement 
and perceived legitimacy has focused on individ- 
ual rather than collective responses (e.g., Thomas, 
Walker, and Zelditch, 1986; Zelditch and Walker, 
1984), this study provides the opportunity to test 
this relationship at the group level. Finally, our 
results highlight the role of the media in influenc- 
ing group perceptions of female executives. 
 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Strength in numbers: legitimation 
Sociologists and organizational theorists provide 
various perspectives of legitimacy. The population 
ecology view considers an organizational form as 
legitimate when its existence is taken for granted 
(Hannan and Carrol, 1992). As such, rising num- 
bers, signifying success in securing resources, rep- 
resent increased legitimation (Hannan and  Car- 
rol, 1992). From an organizational perspective, 
Suchman (1995) defined legitimacy as “a gener- 
alized perception or assumption that the actions 
of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs and definitions” (574). Similarly, 
Scott (1995) argued that legitimacy comes about 
through the authorization or endorsement of par- 
ticular actors in the surrounding environment. 
 
 
 
In addition  to  organizational  forms,  theories 
of legitimation have also been applied to status 
positions in groups. The literature from sociol- 
ogy’s theory of legitimation in task groups argues 
that support for an informal hierarchy frequently 
develops from members’ beliefs, called referen- 
tial beliefs, about the types of people that usually 
hold high- and low-status positions in the sur- 
rounding society (Ridgeway, 1997; Ridgeway and 
Berger, 1986; Ridgeway, Johnson, and Diekema, 
1994). These are widely shared  cultural  beliefs 
that describe what people take to be the typical 
association between individual attributes and the 
occupation of valued status positions in social hier- 
archies (Ridgeway, 1997; Ridgeway and Berger, 
1986; Ridgeway et al., 1994). Prior research find- 
ings indicate that outside support is a necessary 
condition for an authority to achieve the compli- 
ance that signifies legitimacy (Thomas et al., 1986; 
Walker, Thomas, and Zelditch, 1986; Zelditch and 
Walker, 1984). 
Given the small number of females in CEO 
positions and on corporate boards, gender may be a 
particularly salient attribute influencing referential 
beliefs,  resulting  in  an   association  of  males 
with high-status positions in the hierarchy of 
organizations and women with lower levels or 
middle management (Daily and Dalton,  2000; 
Lee and  James,  2007).  As  a  result,  female 
CEOs may have a more difficult time achieving 
legitimation in their position. Evidence supports 
this argument, finding that when a firm appoints 
a female CEO, that firm, in turn, may experience 
a more negative market reaction than if the firm 
had appointed a male CEO (Lee and James, 
2007). 
When a firm appoints a female CEO, the succes- 
sion event may represent an indirect, but symbolic 
endorsement of firms with existing female CEOs 
resulting in a positive market reaction for those 
firms. The appointment of a female CEO may 
implicitly serve as an endorsement of female 
CEOs, in general, thus increasing perceived legiti- 
macy for existing female executives and the firms 
that they lead. Moreover, cognitive legitimacy of 
female executives may increase as more women 
enter into the upper echelons of firms providing 
examples of comparable others. Thus, female 
executives may experience a strength in numbers 
effect in that when an existing female CEO 
receives an outside endorsement, it may provide 
the  symbolic  mechanism  necessary  to  change 
perceptions required to legitimize members of the 
group. 
 
Guilt by association: contagion 
On the other hand, because female CEOs are 
linked together as a coherent group in appointment 
announcements with gender as a salient attribute, 
we may expect a contagion effect. According to 
the finance literature, a contagion effect tradi- 
tionally exists when  a  firm-specific  event  elic- 
its a stock price reaction for  both  the  affected 
firm and its industry counterparts (e.g., Chen, Ho, 
and Shih, 2007; Foster, 1981; Lang and Stulz, 
1992; Laux, Starks, and Yoon, 1998; Szewczyk, 
1992). The primary explanation for the  conta- 
gion effect phenomenon is that  an  event — in 
this case, an announcement — for one firm con- 
veys information regarding other firms as well 
(e.g., Foster, 1981; Lang and Stulz, 1992; Laux 
et al., 1998). Researchers have similarly theo- 
rized that reputation may be a common resource 
shared by all firms in a given industry (King, 
Lenox, and Barnett, 2002).  Thus,  investors  use 
the information provided by one firm to make 
assumptions about other firms in the same indus- 
try (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1992; Laux et al., 
1998). In such cases, a “reputation commons” 
problem may occur if stakeholders sanction all 
firms in an industry as a result of a single firm’s 
actions (King et al., 2002). For example, various 
studies document intraindustry effects in response 
to news releases regarding sales announcements, 
mergers, industrial accidents, regulatory actions, 
and management forecasts (e.g., Bowen, Cas- 
tanias, and Daley, 1983; Eckbo, 1983; Foster, 
1981; Joh and Lee, 1992; Slovin, Sushka, and 
Bendeck, 1991). The majority of these studies 
support a contagion rather than a competition 
effect explanation in response to news releases, 
with stock price reactions typically in the same 
direction as that of the announcing firm (e.g., 
Aharony and Swary, 1983; Baginski, 1987; Fos- 
ter, 1981). For example, when a firm announces 
a bankruptcy, industry rivals experience a gener- 
ally negative stock price reaction (Lang and Stulz, 
1992). 
The contagion effect has also been extended 
beyond industry effects and is often used to explain 
the impact of unfavorable news on financial 
markets as a whole as well as consumer confidence 
(Stringa and Monks, 2007). Therefore, linkages do 
 
 
 
not have to originate from  direct  channels,  but 
can also come about through indirect channels 
such as media reports (Stringa and Monks, 2007). 
In our study, a  contagion  effect  suggests  that 
not only will the firm appointing a female CEO 
experience a negative market reaction (Lee and 
James, 2007), but that  the  portfolio  of  female- 
led firms will also experience a negative  stock 
price reaction associated with the succession event. 
Therefore, we may expect the guilt by association 
effect. 
Thus, although both the legitimacy and con- 
tagion perspectives predict significant intragroup 
effects for female-led firms, the directionality of 
such effects differs. To address this issue, we 
present competing hypotheses, an approach that 
can play an important role in critical theory build- 
ing. In doing so, we put the question of whether 
female CEOs experience strength in numbers or 
guilt by association to a rigorous test. 
Hypothesis 1a: Firms with existing female CEOs 
will experience positive stock market reactions 
when there is a succession event resulting in the 
appointment of a female CEO at another firm. 
Hypothesis 1b: Firms with existing female CEOs 
will experience negative stock market reactions 
when there is a succession event resulting in the 
appointment of a female CEO at another firm. 
 
 
Perceived group entitativity 
The intragroup stock market effects for female 
CEOs may be particularly salient due to percep- 
tions of group entitativity or the degree to which 
groups are perceived as being a coherent, unified 
collective (Campbell, 1958; Hamilton and Sher- 
man, 1996). Entitativity perceptions result when 
“an aggregate of individuals is bonded together in 
some way to constitute a group” (Hamilton, Sher- 
man, and Castelli, 2002: 141). Campbell (1958) 
first used the term entitativity, but it  has  only 
been in recent years that theoretical and empirical 
work on entitativity has increased. This social psy- 
chological perspective of group perceptions con- 
tributes to our understanding of how particular 
features of groups may influence the judgments 
made about these groups (e.g., Campbell, 1958; 
Hamilton and Sherman, 1996; Hamilton, Sherman, 
and Lickel, 1998; Pickett and Perrott, 2004). When 
groups are perceived as being highly entitative, 
they are more likely to be categorized as coher- 
ent groups rather  than  as  incidental  aggregates 
of individual members (Hamilton and Sherman, 
1996; Hamilton et al., 1998; Pickett and Perrott, 
2004). This perception also influences the extent 
to which traits are generalized from one individ- 
ual in a group to other group members (Park and 
Hastie, 1987). 
Implicit in views of entitativity is the assump- 
tion that the degree to which an individual is used 
as a comparison standard for another should be 
influenced not only by whether the individuals are 
actually members of the same group, but also on 
the group’s perceived entitativity (Pickett, 2001; 
Pickett and Perrott, 2004). Evidence suggests that 
high group entitativity makes the comparison pro- 
cess easier. Pickett and Perrott (2004) provide 
strong evidence that high group entitativity percep- 
tions facilitate intragroup comparative judgment. 
Furthermore, previous work has shown that similar 
physical attributes (e.g., race) can lead to percep- 
tions of entitativity in which groups are viewed 
as both physically and psychologically homoge- 
neous, resulting in trait and behavioral judgments 
of the members (Dasgupta, Banaji, and Abelson, 
1999). 
In highly entitative groups, an underlying cog- 
nitive process is implied in which trait impressions 
of the group form from judgments of new infor- 
mation about individual group members (Craw- 
ford, Sherman, and Hamilton, 2002; Park and 
Hastie, 1987). Information on individual mem- 
bers is eventually lost once the group trait infor- 
mation has been abstracted (Pickett and Perrott, 
2004). Thus, a  high  degree  of  group  entitativ- 
ity can lead  to  perceptions  of  interchangeabil- 
ity among individual group members because it 
is difficult to recall information specific to any 
one individual (Pickett and Perrott, 2004). In one 
study, participants asked to recall behaviors of 
observed individuals were more likely to misiden- 
tify two actors from the same group type (i.e., 
confusing family member actions with those of 
a friend, both intimacy groups) than those from 
different types (family member with those of a 
committee member/task group; Sherman, Castelli, 
and Hamilton, 2002). This evidence suggests that 
it is not necessary for individuals to be specif- 
ically instructed to create groups in order for 
entitativity perceptions to influence their represen- 
tation of behaviors (Rutchick, Hamilton, and Sack, 
2008). 
 
 
 
Entitativity, stereotyping, and identity 
Entitativity research is a part of the greater body of 
literature on group perceptions that has primarily 
focused on the role of categorization on stereo- 
typing, people’s belief systems about categories of 
people (Allport, 1954; Fiske, 1998). While stereo- 
typing concerns belief systems regarding groups, 
entitativity takes a step back and explains the 
extent to which people are perceived to be in a 
meaningful and unified group. Thus, entitativity 
perceptions ultimately influence stereotypes and 
related judgments. When groups are perceived as 
highly entitative, members are perceived as “psy- 
chologically interchangeable” (Crawford et al., 
2002; Yzerbyt, Rogier, and Fiske, 1998). Hamilton 
(2007) theorized that when groups are perceived 
as being interchangeable and sharing attributes, 
then generalizing becomes easier and thus facil- 
itates stereotyping (Hamilton, 2007). Results of a 
recent empirical study find support for this argu- 
ment in that entitativity was an important predictor 
in stereotyping of particular groups (Spencer- 
Rodgers, Hamilton, and Sherman, 2007). In sum, 
a person must view an aggregate of individuals as 
a meaningful group before they can have a stereo- 
type regarding that group (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 
2007). 
Entitativity is also relevant to the identity lit- 
erature, which expands upon group categorization 
to argue that the categorization of groups is also 
important for one’s own social identity or belief 
of belonging to certain groups associated with 
some significant emotion or value (Tajfel, 1978; 
Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Empirical research on 
the relationship between entitativity and identity 
has focused on perceptions of in group members 
and associated behaviors such as the relationship 
between perceived in group entitativity and group 
identification (Lickel et al., 2000) or the relation- 
ship between entitativity and ingroup bias (Cas- 
tano et al., 2002; Gaertner and Schopler, 1998). 
Other identity research, however, has examined 
entitativity perceptions of nongroup members and 
associated outcomes (e.g., Sherman et al., 2002). 
For example, highly entitative groups have also 
been found to have a stronger influence on mem- 
bers’ social identity than low entitative groups 
(Castano et al., 2002; Hogg, 2004; Hogg et al., 
2007; Sherman et al., 1999). Entitativity percep- 
tions appear to be important antecedents to peo- 
ple’s social identity, which, in turn, enables people 
to define themselves in the larger social environ- 
ment. 
 
Factors that influence entitativity perceptions 
Perceptions of group entitativity are thought to be 
influenced by the extent of (1) the frequency of 
interaction among members, (2) the importance 
of the group, (3) the similarity among members, 
and (4) the extent to which they share common 
goals and common outcomes (Lickel et al., 2000). 
Importantly, theorists emphasize that groups vary 
in the extent to which they are perceived as having 
entitativity (Campbell, 1958; Hamilton, 2007). 
Thus, groups are not classified dichotomously as 
either entitative or not. Rather, group entitativity 
should be conceptualized along a continuum where 
groups may be viewed as possessing more or fewer 
of these characteristics and qualities. 
 
The role of the media in perceptions of female 
CEOs 
Female CEOs receive a great deal of publicity, 
and the nature of media reports on female CEOs 
contributes to perceptions of female executives as 
being an entitative group. The literature examining 
media effects demonstrates that news  reports 
can be instrumental in shaping perceptions of 
executives and firms (Hayward, Rindova, and 
Pollock, 2004; Rindova et al., 2006). Theorists 
suggest that the media socially constructs a version 
of reality that results in CEOs  being  credited 
with firm strategic actions and outcomes, and, in 
some cases, CEOs becoming synonymous with the 
firms they serve (Hayward et al., 2004; Ketchen, 
Adams, and Shook, 2008). Empirical studies have 
even found that media reports can interact with 
firm performance to influence CEO compensation 
awards (Wade et al., 2006). Thus, we believe that 
the media plays an important role in determining 
perceptions of business firms and executives and 
may be instrumental in creating the impression that 
female CEOs form a cohesive group. 
 
Frequency of interaction and the importance 
of the group 
As noted earlier, the extent of perceived frequency 
of interaction and the importance  of  the  group 
are two characteristics that influence perceptions 
of entitativity (Campbell, 1958; Hamilton, 2007). 
 
 
 
Although female CEOs may not frequently interact 
in the traditional sense (i.e., in person), the fre- 
quency with which the media reports on female 
executives as a coherent group rather than as 
unique individuals may influence perceptions of 
group entitativity. For example, Fortune magazine 
dedicates an annual issue to the “50 Most Powerful 
Women in Business” or “The Power 50” (Kowitt 
and Rupali, 2011; Shambora and Kowitt, 2011), 
The Wall Street Journal until recently published 
its yearly “50 Women to Watch” (Marr, 2008), and 
USA Today conducts an annual performance evalu- 
ation of female CEOs of Fortune 500 companies, 
complete with a listing of each firm along with 
a stock analysis that results in headlines such as 
“Female CEOs struggle in ’04,” “Not-so-good year 
for female CEOs,” or “2009 was great for female 
CEOs’ companies” (Jones, 2005a,b, 2009). Given 
that media reports in general, and female CEO 
announcements specifically, often mention exist- 
ing female CEOs and their firms, the linkages may 
be especially salient due to high perceived group 
entitativity, which facilitates intragroup compar- 
ative judgments (Pickett and Perrott, 2004). As 
an important collective, female CEOs of large 
firms may receive more press as a group pre- 
cisely because they are so underrepresented (Daily 
et al., 1999). Moreover, being a distinctive minor- 
ity likely leads to especial scrutiny (e.g., press) that 
serves to further highlight stereotyping. Accord- 
ingly, perceptions of individual female CEOs, for 
better or worse, may be influenced by perceptions 
of the group, rather than the accomplishments of 
the individual. 
 
Similarity among members 
The emphasis on gender and gender-related stereo- 
types may increase the perceived similarity among 
female CEOs, an additional quality of highly enti- 
tative groups (Campbell, 1958; Hamilton, 2007). 
Announcements of female CEO appointments may 
play a particularly important role in influencing 
group similarity perceptions since these announce- 
ments are so rare that they generate a great amount 
of attention (Lee and James, 2007). Research 
suggests that the media reports female executive 
appointments differently than announcements of 
male counterparts, which reinforces  stereotypes 
by referring to gender (e.g., “woman,” “female,” 
“feminine”), as well as emphasizing information 
regarding  the  CEO’s  family,  which  is  not  the 
case in announcements of male CEOs (Lee and 
James, 2007). Moreover, announcements of female 
executive appointments appear to differ in another 
notable way in that press  reports  often  explic- 
itly link female CEOs together as a heterogeneous 
group, whereas male CEOs are reported as individ- 
uals. Thus, when a new female CEO is announced, 
news articles report that a new member has joined 
the ranks of the “elite sisterhood” (Stanley, 2002) 
or has become one of the “chief executive sisters” 
(Joyce, 2005), which increases the likelihood of 
perceived entitativity of the small, but growing, 
group of female CEOs. Consider a typical excerpt 
from a newspaper article announcing PepsiCo’s 
appointment of a female CEO: 
 
The 50-year-old Nooyi  will  be  the  rarest 
of CEOs: a wife, a mother and a woman 
of color. Nooyi’s appointment makes her 
only the 11th female CEO of a Fortune 500 
company . . . Here are  the  others  . . .  (list 
of all Fortune 500 female CEOs, firms, and 
revenues follows) (Selvin, 2006: C1). 
 
Common goals and outcomes 
The final dimension of entitative groups, percep- 
tions of common goals and outcomes (Campbell, 
1958; Hamilton, 2007), may also be emphasized 
through the nature of media reports. Interest- 
ingly, these media reports linking female CEOs are 
not only prominent for reporting general positive 
news regarding female CEOs (e.g., Fortune’s Most 
Powerful Women) and for CEO appointments, but 
when reporting negative information as well. As 
USA Today reports, “This is going to go down 
as a miserable year for female CEOs of Fortune 
500 companies . . . 2005 can’t end soon enough 
for women who are at the helms of large com- 
panies” (Jones, 2005a: 3B). The article provides 
a list of all current female CEOs along with firm 
names and stock value information. Additionally, 
three recently dismissed female CEOs are named, 
with the added information that the three Fortune 
500 companies where men replaced women have 
“done nicely” (Jones, 2005a: 3B). 
 
Increased publicity and scrutiny of female 
CEO dismissal 
Strategic management researchers have long 
observed the challenges associated with accurately 
 
 
 
identifying the true nature of CEO succession 
because firms rarely fully divulge the actual 
reasons behind CEO dismissals even in light of 
poor firm performance leading up to the departure 
(Beatty and Zajac, 1987; Boeker,  1992;  Denis 
and Denis, 1995; Fredrickson, Hambrick, and 
Baumrin, 1988; Pitcher, Chreim, and Kisfalvi, 
2000; Shen and Cannella, 2002; Warner, Watts, 
and Wruck, 1988; Weisbach, 1988; Wiersema, 
1995). As Beatty and Zajac (1987) explain, “The 
majority of public announcements are silent or 
ambiguous regarding the reason for the CEO 
change” (316). Thus, there is a great deal of diffi- 
culty in distinguishing among voluntary departures 
(e.g., “to spend more time with family”), true 
retirements, and dismissals. 
The difficulty in accurately judging the nature of 
an executive’s departure may be more applicable 
for male CEOs than for their female counterparts. 
Specifically, departing female CEOs may face a 
great deal of personal and professional scrutiny. 
The ousting of Mattel’s Jill Barad resulted in unfa- 
vorable newspaper headlines, which emphasized 
gender  including  “The  Rise  and  Fall  of  Bossy 
Barbie” (Broughton, 2000), “Toy Queen is Top- 
pled” (Helmore, 2000), and The Wall Street Jour- 
nal’s “The Rise and Fall of Toyland’s Princess” 
(Miller,  2000).  Moreover,  research  shows  that 
women managers are evaluated less favorably than 
male managers when performing similar leader- 
ship roles (Eagly, Makhijani, and Klonsky, 1992). 
Media  reports  on  the  downfall  of  Mattel’s  Jill 
Barad  suggest  that  the  press  is  not  immune  to 
this perceptual  bias.  The  article  “Princess  on  a 
Steeple,”  in  The Economist  (1999),  anticipated 
Barad’s departure and claimed that “Barad’s career 
reads like a parable for female chief executives” 
(The Economist ,  1999:  85).  The  article  credits 
Barad’s  “feminine  traits,”  such  as  “energy  and 
charm,” and a “bubbling personality” for her suc- 
cess  in  increasing  Barbie  sales  tenfold  and  her 
board appointment at Microsoft, but also blames 
them for her failure, concluding that they provide 
“evidence that she should have stuck to marketing, 
rather than worrying her pretty little head about 
running the company” (The Economist , 1999: 85). 
Unlike  the  often  ambiguous  context  of  male 
CEO succession, the greater degree of publicity 
and scrutiny awarded female CEOs rarely leaves 
any  question  as  to  the  nature  of  female  CEO 
dismissal.  Ironically,  female  CEOs  may  face 
a  double-edged  sword  in  that  a  common  and 
often ambiguous reason reported for a male 
CEO’s departure in the light of poor performance, 
frequently “a desire to spend more time with his 
family,” may further reinforce gender stereotypes 
if used to cover up a female CEO dismissal. 
In sum, past research has emphasized that the 
rarity of female executives results in a great deal 
of media attention, placing female CEOs under the 
microscope of increased personal and professional 
scrutiny (Daily et al., 1999; Lee and James, 
2007). Further, press reports of CEO appointment 
announcements emphasize gender and personal 
information for female executives significantly 
more so than their male counterparts (Lee and 
James, 2007). We assert that the amount and 
nature of media attention reinforces gender-related 
stereotypes and may contribute to perceptions of 
entitativity. In addition, we argue the press plays 
an active role in creating perceptions of high 
entitativity among female executives by linking 
female CEOs together in media reports whereas 
male CEOs are more likely to be reported on as 
individuals. 
Hypothesis 2: Media reports of CEO appointment 
announcements are more likely to link female 
CEOs as an entitative group based on gender 
compared to male CEO counterparts. 
Although the appointment of a new female 
CEO may lead to increased legitimacy for the 
group as a whole, the increased coverage and 
scrutiny associated with female CEO dismissals 
may negatively affect shareholder value for the 
remaining female-led firms. Prior research sug- 
gests media coverage affects perceptions of legiti- 
macy by bringing attention and exposure to firms 
(e.g., Fombrun, 1995; Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001; 
McCombs et al., 1997; Pollock and Rindova, 2003; 
Suchman, 1995). In addition, the media’s framing 
of information, whether negative or positive, has 
been found to influence legitimacy perceptions of 
political candidates (McCombs, 1981; McCombs 
et al., 1997). Pollock and Rindova (2003) found 
support for their proposition that media coverage 
affects the legitimacy of IPOs, thereby influencing 
investors’ perceptions. By extension, as long as 
the media continues to cover female CEO perfor- 
mance and dismissals with increased scrutiny and 
an emphasis on gender stereotypes, the remain- 
ing female CEOs may be cast in a negative light. 
Whereas the addition to the list of female CEOs of 
 
 
 
large firms may serve as an outside endorsement, 
the dismissal of a female executive may reinforce 
existing referential beliefs and send a signal which 
decreases legitimacy for firms currently employing 
female CEOs. Thus, we believe that when a female 
CEO is dismissed, other firms with female CEOs 
may suffer a decline in stock price by experiencing 
guilt by association. 
Hypothesis 3. Firms with existing female CEOs 
will experience negative stock market reactions 
when there is a succession event resulting in an 
announcement of a female CEO dismissal at 
another firm. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
Sample and data collection 
The hypothesized relationships were tested by 
examining all female CEO announcements and 
dismissals between 1991 and 2006 in order to 
avoid confounding events associated with the 
financial crisis in 2008.  The  firms  considered 
for analysis in this study consisted of the entire 
population of female-led Fortune 1000 and 
Fortune Global 500 firms for the 16-year period 
ending 31 December 2006. The male sample 
used for comparison consisted of all male-led 
Fortune 50 firms from 2003 through 2006 in 
order to obtain a comparative sample of CEOs. 
Although male CEO appointments are not novel, 
Fortune 50 firms tend to be in the media spotlight 
and their executives may be perceived as linked 
through membership in this elite group. Firms 
were initially identified using the COMPUSTAT 
Executive Compensation Database. We identified 
the appointment and dismissal dates for each 
female CEO using LexisNexis searches that 
included newspapers, magazine articles, industry 
newsletters, press releases, and news wires. This 
search resulted in 35 unique female CEO appoint- 
ment announcements and 19 male appointments 
used for the initial sample for Hypothesis 1. Full 
text announcements from New York Times and 
Wall Street Journal articles were then extracted 
and used to test Hypothesis 2. 
We also used LexisNexis to search the same 
sources for confounding events at both the focal 
and peer firms during a time period starting from 
three days prior and ending three days  after 
each  announcement.  Two  announcements  were 
eliminated because the female executives were 
founders of the firms that they led. In addition, 
in one case a female CEO was dismissed one day 
prior to an appointment announcement of a female 
CEO at another firm. We regarded this as a con- 
founding event given the occurrence of both events 
simultaneously within the specified three-day anal- 
ysis window and both were deleted from the sam- 
ple. We also searched for confounding events at 
both the male focal and peer firms and removed 
those associated with  confounding  events  such 
as mergers, acquisitions, other executive appoint- 
ments or dismissals, and company scandals. The 
remaining sample used in the analyses included 
those in which only one event appeared to have 
happened in the three-day analysis window. This 
procedure left 33 unique appointments and 11 
CEO departures at female-led firms along with 12 
unique appointments at male-led firms. All dis- 
missals appeared to be nonvoluntary terminations 
as opposed to planned retirements. 
In order to test the effect of a female CEO 
appointment or dismissal announcement on other 
female-led firms (Hypotheses 1 and 3), we first 
formed a portfolio of all female-led firms with 
stock returns from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP). This approach is consis- 
tent with prior research when testing intraindustry 
effects (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1992; Xu, Najand, 
and Ziegenfuss, 2006). This process required form- 
ing a peer female-led firm portfolio for each 
announcement (or dismissal) and  then  pooling 
the peer portfolios together to test abnormal 
returns. Female-led firm portfolios include all other 
female-led firms in our sample on any given 
announcement date. For example, if a female CEO 
was appointed on April 3, 2003, then the associ- 
ated female-led portfolio for that announcement 
would consist of all other firms in our sample that 
had a female CEO on April 3, 2003. This proce- 
dure was repeated for each announcement event 
date. Abnormal returns of the firms in the female 
portfolios were then pooled in order to determine 
if other female-led firms, as a whole, experience 
abnormal stock returns. Overall, the female-led 
firm portfolios included 26 companies per event 
on average with a range of 11 – 39 female-led firms 
over the sixteen-year period. 
The same pooling procedure was then com- 
pleted for each male appointment announcement. 
After eliminating confounding events at peer firms, 
the male-led firm portfolios included 45 companies 
 
 
 
per event on average with a range of 38 – 48 over 
the sample period. This resulted in 395 firms in 
our portfolio for appointment events and 101 firms 
in our portfolio for dismissal events at female-led 
firms. It also resulted in 443 firms in our portfo- 
lio for appointment events at male-led firms. Of 
these, 26 firms in the announcement portfolio and 
11 firms in the dismissal portfolio at female-led 
firms and 19 firms in the announcement portfo- 
lio at male-led firms were dropped due to missing 
information. Thus, our final analysis consisted of 
369 usable firms in our portfolio for appointment 
events and 90 usable firms in our portfolio for dis- 
missal events at female-led firms, as well as 424 
firms in our portfolio for appointment events at 
male-led firms. 
 
Analysis 
To test Hypotheses 1 and 3, we used the mar- 
ket model event study methodology to examine 
stock price responses to announcements and dis- 
missals of female CEOs (e.g., McWilliams and 
Siegel, 1997; Peterson, 1989). We use the CRSP 
(1991 – 2006) equally weighted index as a proxy 
for market returns1991 – 2006. We measure abnor- 
mal returns for peer firms as the difference between 
the actual return and the expected return gener- 
ated by the market model. The peer firms for each 
announcement (or dismissal) were then pooled 
together to test the cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAAR) (Xu et al., 2006). CAAR is the 
sum of the average abnormal returns of the female- 
led (or male-led) peer portfolios. Our parameters 
of the market model are estimated using the data 
over the period from 255 to 46 days before the 
announcement date. We used the CAAR of the 
peer portfolios for a three-day window (−1, +1), 
as well as examining daily abnormal returns within 
the window in addition to abnormal returns on a 
daily basis. We chose a short event window in 
order to reduce the likelihood of unrelated events 
affecting abnormal returns calculations (Johnson 
et al., 2005; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). We 
define day 0 as the initial announcement date 
identified and calculate the  abnormal  return  as 
the difference between the actual return and an 
expected return generated by the equally weighted 
market model. To compensate for issues of cross- 
sectional correlation,  we used the Patell test to 
report standardized returns (Patell, 1976). The 
Patell test mitigates possible variance increase on 
the event date by performing a cross-sectional 
variance adjustment (Boehmer, Musumeci, and 
Poulsen, 1991). Further, if an announcement came 
on a closed trading day, the next trading day was 
used. The EVENTUS program available on the 
Wharton Research Data Services website was used 
to estimate all models and evaluate the significance 
of the abnormal returns (Cowan, 2005). 
A text analysis was completed on the sample of 
33 female and 12 male CEO appointments in order 
to test Hypothesis 2. We reviewed the announce- 
ment articles for female CEO appointments to 
determine if any additional female executives were 
mentioned. The same text review was completed 
for the male announcements. In cases where other 
executives were mentioned, we recorded any link- 
ages between the CEOs (i.e., gender). A t -test was 
used to test for significant differences between the 
male and female announcements. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Results of Hypothesis 1a and 1b are reported in 
Tables 1 and 2. The  average  abnormal  returns 
and Patel z -values listed in Table 3 provide 
information about returns for the event win- 
dow. Hypothesis 1a and 1b present competing 
hypotheses regarding the directionality of the 
predicted intragroup abnormal returns following 
the appointment of a new female CEO for firms 
with a female CEO already in place. Hypothesis 
1a was not supported. Consistent with Hypothesis 
1b and a contagion effect, the female-led firms 
experience statistically significant negative cumu- 
lative abnormal returns of −0.58 percent for the 
event window (−1, +1,) in reaction to a female 
CEO succession event at another firm, which is 
significantly greater than zero, p < 0.05. In further 
support of our results, male-led firms in the 
comparison sample did not experience significant 
cumulative abnormal returns for the event window 
(−1, +1) in reaction to a male CEO appointment 
at another firm (Patell Z = −1.5; p = 0.07). 
In  testing  Hypothesis  2,  our  text  analysis 
revealed that 18 (55%) female CEO appointment 
announcements made reference to other female 
executives. In all cases, no common linkage (e.g., 
industry) other than gender could be identified 
between the female executives mentioned. No 
male CEO announcement articles of the 12 exam- 
ined  made  reference  to  other  male  executives. 
 
 
 
Table   1.    Abnormal   market   returns   surrounding   the 
announcement of CEO appointments 
Table   4.    Abnormal   market   returns   surrounding   the 
announcement of female CEO dismissal 
 
  
Market-adjusted  model 
Female CEOs Male CEOs 
Market-adjusted  model 
 
 
Days Abnormal return (%) Patell Z 
 
Days 
Abnormal 
return (%)    Patell Z 
Abnormal 
return (%)    Patell Z 
 
(H2) Cumulative abnormal returns 
   −1 to +1 0.20 −0.028 
(H1) Cumulative abnormal returns 
−1 to +1 −0.58 −2.132a −0.19 −1.508 
0 to +1 −0.46 −2.025a 0.07 0.871 
0 to +2 −0.20 −0.270 0.09 0.864 
 
 
a Denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table    2.    Excess    market    returns    surrounding    the 
announcement of a female CEO appointment 
 
 
  Market-adjusted  model   
Days Abnormal returns (%) Patell Z 
0 to +1 0.38 0.358 
0 to +2 0.23 −0.305 
 
 
 
Table    5.    Excess    market    returns    surrounding    the 
announcement of a female CEO dismissal 
 
 
Market-adjusted  model 
 
 
Days Abnormal returns (%) Patell Z 
 
 
−5 0.25 0.18 
−4 −0.27 −0.66 
   −3 0.44 1.19 
−5 0.20 0.74 
−4 −0.04 0.19 
−3 −0.05 −0.10 
−2 −0.02 0.56 
−1 −0.18 −1.08 
0 −0.13 −0.96 
1 −0.29 −2.19* 
2 0.19 1.457 
3 −0.12 −1.15 
4 −0.03 −0.73 
5 −0.03 0.27   
 
*Statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
 
 
Table  3.    Text  analysis  comparison  of  female  versus 
male CEO announcements 
−2 0.10 −0.01 
−1 −0.18 −0.55 
0 0.10 −0.30 
1 0.28 −0.80 
2 −0.15 −1.03 
3 0.07 0.41 
4 −0.21 −1.17 
5 −0.12 −1.25 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Overall, our results provide support for our 
contention that there may be intragroup effects for 
firms with female CEOs, while intragroup effects 
   do  not  exist  for  male  CEOs.  Moreover,  these 
results suggest that female CEOs may experience 
guilt by association. While prior work has shown 
that investors react more negatively to the appoint- 
ment of female CEOs than to male counterparts 
   (Lee and James, 2007), we find there may also 
be a contagion effect in which firms with existing 
The results of a t -test provide strong support for 
Hypothesis 2 (t = 3.709, p < 0.0001) as reported 
in Table 3. 
Hypothesis 3 states that a dismissal of a female 
CEO will result in negative abnormal returns for 
firms with existing female CEOs. The average 
abnormal returns and Patel z -values are reported 
in Tables 4 and 5. Surprisingly, although not 
statistically significant, the mean abnormal returns 
for female-led firms was positive at 0.20 percent. 
Thus, we did not find support for Hypothesis 3. 
female CEOs are also penalized. Evidence from 
our text analysis of announcement appointments 
suggests that this may occur because the media 
contributes to perceptions  of  group  entitativity 
by reporting on female CEOs as a group while 
reporting on male  CEOs  as  individual  leaders 
of specific firms. Moreover, as noted in prior 
studies, the content of media reports differs for 
female CEO appointments making gender more 
salient (Daily and Dalton, 2000; Lee and James, 
2007). Finally, the increased publicity surrounding 
N M SD T df Sig 
Females 33 
Males 12 
0.55 
 
0.00 
0.51 
 
0.00 
 
3.709 
 
43 
 
p < 0.0001 
 
 
 
 
 
female CEO appointments and dismissals, as well 
as a great deal of scrutiny of current female 
CEOs, may contribute to these effects. 
While our results constitute interesting evidence 
of intragroup effects for female-led firms, the 
unexpected non-finding regarding female CEO 
dismissals warrants further exploration. As a result 
of female-led firms receiving a large degree of 
scrutiny and press coverage, a possible explana- 
tion is that the dismissal of a female CEO does not 
come as a surprise, but is anticipated long before 
the actual event date, thus making it difficult to 
identify an appropriate event date for analysis. 
This explanation is consistent with prior research, 
which has emphasized the challenges inherent in 
CEO dismissal research (James and Soref, 1981; 
Mizruchi, 1983). Our own post hoc analysis lends 
some support to this assertion. When examining 
a two-week window leading up to the actual 
dismissal announcement, the female-led firms did 
in fact experience statistically significant negative 
abnormal returns. This suggests that investors 
may have indeed anticipated the dismissal and 
were influenced by negative publicity occurring 
before the actual event date. 
This study contributes to the strategic man- 
agement literature in a  number  of  ways.  First, 
we provide evidence that significant intragroup 
effects may exist for  female-led  firms  but  do 
not appear to exist for male CEO counterparts. 
Second, although prior research, especially in the 
economics and finance disciplines, has examined 
intraindustry effects (Chen et al., 2007; Lang and 
Stulz, 1992; Laux et al., 1998), to our knowledge, 
this is the first study of this type examining intra- 
group market effects at firms that are seemingly 
unrelated other than by the gender of their CEO. 
Our results also reinforce prior research suggest- 
ing that the media may play an important role in 
influencing perceptions of female executives as a 
group (Daily and Dalton, 2000; Lee and James, 
2007). Our findings indicate that female-led firms 
may need to be proactive in public relations 
efforts during  female  CEO  succession  events 
at other firms. Further, the organization should 
actively take steps to bring legitimacy to  the 
CEO by managing press releases in a way that 
highlights the qualifications and accomplishments 
of the CEO, while minimizing gender-related 
stereotypes. 
The results of this study highlight the need for 
future research. The entitativity literature is new 
to management research and has not yet been 
explored in relation to  other  existing  theories. 
We would benefit  from  a  better  understanding 
of how entitativity fits in the established identity 
and cognition theories, for example. Additional 
research may also further explore the role of the 
media on investor perceptions of group entitativity. 
For example, African-American CEOs of Fortune 
500  firms  are  also  frequently  reported  on  as 
a group (e.g., Daniels and Sutro, 2002; Jones, 
2005c), as are foreign-born CEOs leading U.S. 
firms (e.g., Story, 2007). We  concur  with  Lee 
and James (2007) in that as more women are 
appointed to CEO positions, longitudinal research 
is needed to determine whether negative contagion 
effects become  weaker over  time  as   female 
CEO appointments become viewed as less novel 
occurrences. 
While the number of firms led by female CEOs 
has grown in recent years, women are still dis- 
tinctly underrepresented in corporate executive 
offices (Daily et al., 1999; Helfat et al., 2006). As a 
result, appointments and dismissals of female chief 
executives attract an inordinate amount of media 
attention. These press accounts emphasize similar-
ities among these executives by focusing on issues 
related to gender (Lee and James, 2007). This leads 
to the perception that female CEOs are members 
of a homogeneous or highly entitative group in 
which individuals lose their uniqueness and take 
on general characteristics of the group. This phe- 
nomenon was found to have market implications. 
It is possible that some reporters may be focus- 
ing too much attention on women executives as a 
part of an overall trend to promote female CEOs, 
while, paradoxically, harming the enterprise. We 
suspect that as the number of female CEOs contin- 
ues to grow, this group of executives will gradually 
be perceived  as increasingly heterogeneous  and 
the guilt by association that characterizes firms 
employing female CEOs will diminish, allowing 
these executives to ultimately be judged by their 
individual accomplishments, rather than those of 
the entire group. 
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